No Talk To Pak – Pradeep Malode
There is a strange selective amnesia in Pakistan especially in the Army, the ISI, terrorist organisations which runs Pakistan and now in the mainstream public. The people have been brainwashed since 1947. It started with Jinnah, who wanted a separate homeland for Muslims, as he felt that Hindus and Muslims cannot live in peace with each other.
This was discredited almost the day “mother of terrorism Pakistan” was created. More Muslims stayed behind in India than went to Pakistan. They have served with distinction in every institution in India and I respect them, especially our late President of India, Abdul Kalam sahab, not for political reasons but because he was an exceptional man.
Lets come to topic … The so called liberal view i.e “The Talk”.
The history of the past few decades stands a testimony of continuing Pakistani perfidy notwithstanding many endeavors by India to mend relations; its neighbor’s machinations have included using terror extensively as an instrument of state policy (bleed by thousand cuts) to destabilize India. That the 26/11 Mumbai terror masterminds Messrs Saeed and Lakhvi (among many fathers of Imran khan) roam free in Pakistan and publicly continue to spew hatred at India does cast a doubt on the current Pakistani establishment’s intentions towards India.
Conciliatory measures with Pakistan are doomed to fail because Pakistan’s animus against India is not strategic or Geo-political but visceral in nature; a deep set historical antipathy that it has failed to modulate in keeping with the changing world and modern times. Stuck in a time wrap that harks back to the medieval period of Muslim hegemony, Pakistan is trying to resurrect that era as is evident from the branding of its missiles with the names of the brutal , illegitimate sons, Islamic invaders of yore like Mahmud of Ghazni and Ghori
Consequently, the very political construct of Pakistan militates against harmony with India. Pakistan is not a nation state in the traditional sense of the term. It lacks an accountable hierarchy with checks and balances that conform to a global order. In fact, Pakistan is not a state at all. It is conglomerate of anti-India interests masquerading as a nation — an evil triumvirate of a pliable civilian government that acts as a front for an Indo-phobic army that master minds attacks on India with the aid of ‘non-state actors’ (read terrorists).
PROSPECTS FOR A SETTLEMENT
- India’s clear geopolitical, economic, and military superiority implies that Pakistan cannot compel it to revise the status quo by force. Nor does India have to offer any compromises to procure peace because it is both a satisfied and dominant power. Since Pakistan lacks the means to either wrest the territories it lays claims to or reverse its continuing relative decline vis-a-vis India, the path to peace depends largely on Pakistan’s willingness to accept its current strategic circumstances.
- Since the full subordination of the Pakistani military to its civilian leadership is unlikely for the foreseeable future, a shift in Pakistan’s orientation and behavior will depend fundamentally on the military itself. The army’s former chief of staff Pervez Musharraf provided the best hope to date that peace could be negotiated by an idiosyncratic military leader who is willing to change the army’s objectives with respect to India. Unfortunately, Musharraf has proven to be the exception, not the norm, in the Pakistan Army.
- Great power mediation is not an adequate alternative for peace either, since the United States lacks the means to alter Pakistan’s strategic calculus and China lacks the desire. Even if motivated, however, China would likely utilize Pakistan to slow down the rise of its emerging Asian competitor, India.
The reluctance of the Pakistan Army to accept the substantive consequences of Pakistan’s inferiority to India magnifies the grievances that lie at the root of the strategic competition between the two states. The most obvious explanation for this recalcitrance is the army’s own interest in preserving power within Pakistan itself. These variables have been highlighted in this report, but a more comprehensive explanation would include many other factors as well. The issue of worldview, and the army’s self-image as the guardian of the ideology of Pakistan, would have to be accorded an important role. The army’s interest in utilizing external conflicts to protect its own institutional integrity would also acquire relevance. Likewise, the strong cognitive and motivational biases that have distorted the army’s perception of both its circumstances and those of India — and the manner in which these conceptions are reproduced organizationally within the military — would have to be acknowledged.
Unless the peace process produces direct benefits for the Pakistani military — and these gains are both tangible and psychic — its incentives to support any reconciliation are minimal.
JAY HIND ….